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PREPAYMENT FOR FUTURE SERVICES:
To WHAT EXTENT IS DEFERRAL ALLOWED?
by
Clare L. Garner, Jr. *
Introduction
If an objective observer, uninitiated into the vagaries and
mysteries of tax accounting, were to read only the Internal Revenue
Code provisions regarding allowable accounting methods and the
Treasury Regulations enforcing these provisions, he would be sur-
prised when he later discovered the rule that prepayments for ser-
vices to be rendered beyond the current taxable year, received
without restriction as to their disposition, are generally taxable
to accrual basis taxpayers in the year of receipt regardless of when
the expenses of earning the receipts are to be incurred. Such a
rule of immediate inclusion flies in the face of traditional finan-
cial accrual accounting principles which seek an accurate portrayal
of the financial picture of a business entity by matching revenues
from services with the related expenses incurred in generating
that income. This rule of immediate inclusion upon receipt of pay-
ment for future services was finally established, after a long and
disjointed evolutionary process, in the celebrated "trilogy" of
United States Supreme Court cases decided between 1957 and
1963.1 Since the 1967 case of Artnell Co. v. Commissioner was
decided by the Seventh'Circuit, there has been a noticeable judicial
and even administrative trend creating exceptions to the general
rule of immediate inclusion.
*B.A. 1977, Emory University (Economics/mathematics); J.D., 1980, University of Georgia;
LL.M. (Taxation), 1981, University of Florida; Member Arthur Andersen & Co., Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida.
1. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); American
Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S.
128 (1963).
2. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
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Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York's decision in RCA Corp. v. United States' broke new
ground in the prepaid income area of tax law by holding that "a
taxpayer is entitled to rely on reliable statistical projections of an-
ticipated expenses in determining the extent to which prepaid
amounts should be included in gross income in tax years other
than that of their receipt, in accordance with the principles of ac-
crual accounting." This significant expansion of the trend creating
exceptions to the general rule of immediate inclusion upon receipt
was short lived, as the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's
holding on appeal.5
This article will discuss the history and present state of the
law concerning the proper taxable year of inclusion of prepayments
for services to be rendered beyond the current taxable year by
accrual basis taxpayers, with a special emphasis on RCA Corp.
v. United States.
EARLY HISTORY OF PREPAID INCOME TREATMENT,
In response to growing pressure from economists and
businessmen, Congress enacted a provision in the Revenue Act
of 1916 allowing taxpayers to compute annual taxable income on
the basis of the method used to compute annual accounting in-
come, unless the book method did not "clearly reflect income."'
The United States Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Anderson7 that the purpose of this provision impliedly allowing
the accrual method was "to enable taxpayers to keep their books
and make their returns according to scientific accounting prin-
ciples, by charging against income earned during the taxable
period, the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the
process of earning income during that period; . ... I
Presumably under the Anderson rationale, an accrual basis
taxpayer would not include receipts for services in gross income
until the year in which the receipts were "earned." This has not
been the case. In a line of Tax Court cases beginning in 1930
with Automobile Underwriters, Inc. ,9 the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has managed to persuade the Tax Court that prepayments
3. 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
4. Id. at 516.
5. 664 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982).
6. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8(g) and 13(d), 39 Stat. 756, 763, 771 (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. §446(b) (1976)).
7. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
8. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
9. 19 B.T.A. 1160 (1930).
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for future services must be returned by accrual basis taxpayers
in the year of receipt even if not yet earned. 0 The rationale for
requiring immediate inclusion was originally the question-begging
assertion that the prepayments "ripened into gross income" by mere
reason of their receipt."
In North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet," decided in
1932, the Supreme Court articulated the "claim of right doctrine"
which was soon adopted as the underlying rationale justifying the
rule requiring immediate inclusion of prepayments for future ser-
vices for accrual basis taxpayers. It is interesting to note that North
American Oil did not deal with the situation where receipts were
"unearned" at the time of receipt. 3 All that North American Oil
held was that taxpayers who received receipts which had already
been earned, under a claim of right and without restriction as to
disposition, must report them in the year of receipt.1"
The Supreme Court expressly applied the claim of right doc-
trine to an accrual basis taxpayer in Brown v. Helvering,"5 but
that case merely stands for the proposition that an accrual basis
taxpayer who receives payments for services already rendered,
where the payments are received under a claim of right without
restriction as to disposition, must include those payments in gross
income in the year of receipt, even if there is a contingent liabili-
ty to return the payments in later years."' The case does not square-
ly apply to the situation where an accrual basis taxpayer has re-
ceived unearned advances for services to be rendered in the future.
In spite of these distinctions, the Tax Court continued to require
accrual basis taxpayers to include prepayments for future services
in the year of receipt, using the new-found claim of right doc-
trine as its justification. 7 Outside the Tax Court, there were few
10. See Bradstreet Company of Maine v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1093 (1931); Northern
Illinois College of Optometry v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. 664 (1943); Your Health Club, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 385 (1944); and National Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 159
(1947).
11. Automobile Underwriters, 19 B.T.A. at 1165.
12. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
13. See Behren, Prepaid Income Accounting Concepts and the Tax Law, 15 TAX L. REV.
343, 347 (1960).
14. The method of accounting in North American Oil Consolidated was not stated. In dicta,
the Court stated that it was not material "for the purposes of this case, whether the company's
return was filed on the cash receipts and disbursements basis or the accrual basis." 286 U.S. at 423.
15. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
16. See Behren, supra note 13, at 347-48.
17. See supra cases cited note 10. Note that during this time the Tax Court distinguished
prepayments for the sale of goods and land, allowing deferral. Sophie M. Garretson v. Commis-
sioner, 10 B.T.A. 1381 (1928); Summit Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 983 (1930);Veenstra
& De Haan Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 964 (1948); and Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co.
v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); But see Wallace Moritz v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 622
(1954).
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cases dealing with the accrual basis taxpayer and prepayments
for future services, at least until 1955.18
PREPAYMENT FROM SECTIONS 452 AND 462
Of The 1954 CODE To THE SUPREME COURT TRILOGY
As part of the comprehensive revision of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1954, Congress enacted sections 452 and 462 allowing
deferral of prepaid income and deductions of reserves for estimated
future expenses."' The reason for the statutes was a desire to har-
monize tax accounting with accepted business accounting, so as
to avoid "distortion" of income caused by not matching revenues
and expenses relating to prepayments for sales of goods and
services. 20
Soon after the enactment of sections 452 and 462 in 1954,
the Internal Revenue Service received major shocks when two
Circuit Court cases, decided under pre-1954 Code tax law, came
down. In Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,1 the Tenth
Circuit rejected the use of the Commissioner's favorite weapon
in the prepaid income area, the claim-of-right doctrine. The court
held that an accrual basis taxpayer who received prepaid
newspaper subscriptions could defer income because of the fixed
dates on which the subscriptions were to be satisfied. "2 In Pacific
Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner,2" the Ninth Circuit al-
lowed a deduction for estimated future expenses of shipping mer-
chandise to customers where there was a fixed obligation. These
cases served to muddy the waters since they went against the
presumed state of the law prohibiting deferral of unearned income
and deduction of estimated expenses.
Later in 1955, the Congress retroactively repealed sections
452 and 462 of the 1954 Code." There was Congressional ap-
prehension that the transitional rules phasing in the new statutes
were inadequate in that the revenue losses in the phase-in year
18. See Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938); South
Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943).
19. I.R.C. § § 452 and 462 (1954). Although there are some technical distinctions between
deferring prepaid income and deducting estimated future expenses, the underlying principles are
similar. Both are methods for matching future expenses of earning prepayments against the
prepayments themselves. See the discussion by Judge Drennen in Simplified Tax Records, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 75, 79 (1963). However, it is important to remember the greater risk
of loss of tax revenues inherent in deferral. See Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d
400, 407 (5th Cir. 1969). See also, Comment, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 511 (1967).
20. See Austin, Surrey, Warren, and Winkour, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Tax
Accounting, 68 HARV. L. REV. 257, 273 (1954).
21. 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
22. Id.
23. 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955).
24. Pub. L. No. 84-74, 69 Stat. 134 (1955).
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were thought to be alarmingly higher than anticipated. " It is widely
agreed that Congress intended to withdraw sections 452 and 462
and restore this area of tax law to what it would have been had
the statutes never been enacted, while working on a better statute.'
Indeed, it is clear that when Congress repealed sections 452 and
462, it was fully aware of the pro-taxpayer holdings earlier in
1955 by the Tenth and Ninth Circuits in Beacon Publishing and
Pacific Grape Products, and intended no positive or negative in-
terferences in judicial interpretation of the tax law in the area.27
The Tax Court, meanwhile in Curtis R. Andrews v.
Commissioner,28 thought that the claim-of-right doctrine rejected
in the prepaid income area in Beacon Publishing was as valid as
ever, and required immediate inclusion of prepayments for future
services. However, the Fifth Circuit in Schuessler v.
Commissioner9 allowed a deduction for estimated future expenses
involving a fixed service obligation, following the reasoning of
Beacon Publishing."0
THE SUPREME COURT TRILOGY
When Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner31 was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1957, the law concerning
prepayments for future services was unclear, since Beacon
Publishing seemed to clearly demolish the use of the claim of right
rationale to tax prepaid income immediately. The Service, aware
of the vulnerability of the claim of right doctrine in the prepaid
income context, came up with a new rationale for taxing prepaid
income currently: Internal Revenue Code §446(b). Section 446(b)
gives the Commissioner discretion to change the taxpayer's method
of tax accounting if it does not "clearly reflect income. " "
25. See H.R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1955); S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4-5 (1955); Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 4725, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1955).
26. See Justice Stewart's dissent in American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S.
687, 703-11 (1961); Alvin, 'Prepaid Income'. How the Commissioner Turned Liabilities Into In-
come Under the 1954 Code, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 482, 484 (1965); Behren, supra note 13 at 355-56;
Cromatarie, Advance Payments: Income Yes, But When?, 24th TUL. TAX INST. 238, 387-88 (1972).
27. H.R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955); S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong.,
1 st Sess. 5-6 (1955), wherein it was stated concerning Pacific Grape: "An extension of the prin-
ciples laid down in this case might well lead the courts in the future to permit the accrual of most
estimated expenses which would be covered by section 462 even though this section is repealed."
28. 23 T.C. 1026, 1032 (1955).
29. 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
30. Id. at 725.
31. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
32. I.R.C. §446(b)(1976) provides: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used
by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable
income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income."
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In Automobile Club of Michigan, the Supreme Court had its
first opportunity to decide a case dealing with prepayment for
future services to an accrual basis taxpayer. In this case, the tax-
payer received prepayment of membership dues covering a one-
year period during which the taxpayer promised to render ser-
vices at the member's request. The accrual basis taxpayer used
the payments without restriction as to disposition, and for tax and
book purpose arbitrarily prorated the dues on a monthly basis,
causing a deferral of "unearned" dues remaining at the end of the
year.
The Automobile Club Court heard the Commissioner's asser-
tion of the claim of right doctrine, but seemingly ignored it and
focused on the wide discretion given the Commissioner under sec-
tion 446(b)." The Court upheld the exercise of the Commissioner's
discretion in disallowing the deferral here on the basis of Code
section 446(b), reasoning as follows: "The pro rata allocation of
the membership dues in monthly amounts is purely artificial and
bears no relation to the services which petitioner may in fact be
called upon to render for the member."34 It was the "artificiality"
of the taxpayer's pro rata tax accounting method of deferral that
caused it to not clearly reflect income, leaving the Commissioner
room to reject the method and impose a method requiring im-
mediate inclusion. Justices Harlan, Burton and Clark registered
dissents to the rule of immediate inclusion there.
Two years after the Supreme Court decided Automobile Club
of Michigan, its first case of what was to become a "trilogy" of
cases, the Second Circuit decided Bressner Radio, Inc. v.
Commissioner. 35 The Bressner court viewed Automobile Club of
Michigan as having turned on the fact that the pro rata monthly
deferral method used there was "purely artificial," and as having
assumed that a more realistic deferral method would have been
permissible."' The Bressner court found the pro rata equal
monthly deferral method used by the taxpayer in the case at bar
did a reasonably accurate job in deferring revenues until they were
33. Automobile Club of Michigan, 353 U.S. at 189.
34. Id. (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Court carefully distinguished Beacon Publishing
Co. where there were fixed dates for the future services and specifically indicated that they ex-
pressed no opinion on those two cases. Id. at 189 n.20.
35. 267 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1959). Compare Streight Radio & Television, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1962), disallowing deferral
because the taxpayer failed to show that the deferral method sufficiently matched revenue and
related expenses.
36. Id. at 528.
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earned and matching them with foreseeable related expenses, since
the historical experience of the taxpayer demonstrated a reasonably
uniform demand for services it had an obligation to render on
demand. The Service soon issued a Revenue Ruling " announc-
ing that it would not follow Bressner Radio, citing the misapplied
claim of right doctrine and Automobile Club of Michigan.
In 1961, the Supreme Court decided American Automobile
Association v. United States, 8 the second case in the Supreme
Court trilogy involving prepaid income, and perhaps the most im-
portant case in the area. In a five to four decision,"9 the Supreme
Court again rejected a pro rata equal monthly deferral method
used by an accrual method taxpayer to report income arising from
one year membership dues received in advance."°
The AAA Court based its rejection of the taxpayer's deferral
method on the "artificiality" of the method of pro rata monthly
deferral used here, the same section 446(b) ground it used in
Automobile Club of Michigan. The problem which, in the'Court's
view, caused a distortion of income was that deferring the prepaid
dues in pro rata equal monthly amounts did not properly match
the revenues with the related expenses which in fact actually varied
from month to month. The Court reasoned that since the services
were to be performed only upon a member's demand and without
relation to fixed future dates, the use of a pro rata equal monthly
deferral method was "purely artificial."1
The taxpayer in AAA used a substantially identical pro rata
equal monthly deferral method as the taxpayer in Automobile Club
of Michigan."2 The only difference the Court faced in AAA was
the fact that unlike the taxpayer in Automobile Club of Michigan,
the taxpayer in AAA offered evidence that its deferral method was
in harmony with generally accepted accounting principles, and
that statistics compiled on average monthly costs showed that the
deferral method used happened to correlate roughly to the average
costs. 3 The Court found the offered evidence insufficient to wipe
37. Rev. Rul. 60-85, 1960-1 C.B. 181. The Commissioner later partially relaxed his view
against Bressner Radio in Rev. Rul. 71-299, 1971-2 C.B. 218 to harmonize with Rev. Proc. 71-21,
1971-2 C.B. 549.
38. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
39. Interestingly, Mr. Justice Clark wrote the AAA majority opinion, yet dissented in
Automobile Club of Michigan on the prepaid income issue. Automobile Club of Michigan was
a 5 to 3 decision.
40. 367 U.S. at 688-89.
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away the charge that the deferral method was "purely artificial."
First, the Court noted that the criteria of annual tax accounting
were not always satisfied by financial accounting standards."' Se-
cond, the Court rejected the attempted after-the-fact justification
of the pro rata equal monthly deferral method which compared
the pro rata equal monthly method used to the actual way the
average cost per month turned out."s Presumably the taint of "ar-
tificiality" could have been removed if the taxpayer had been able
to predict before-the-fact, with reasonable accuracy, the future
expenses related to the prepaid dues. " The court seemed to re-
ject AAA's hit-and-miss deferral method which by chance happened
to come close (but not close enough) to the actual related expenses
of rendering the promised services.
The AAA Court rested its rejection of the deferral method
on the grounds that the enactment and repeal of Code sections
452 and 462 by Congress, coupled with the enactment of Code
section 455 allowing deferral for publishers having prepaid
subscriptions and the rejection of a similar statute allowing deferral
for prepaid auto club membership dues, indicated that the Court
should defer to Congress "in this case."" The Court immediately
concluded as follows: "[Welfind only that, in light of existing pro-
visions not specifically authorizing it, the exercise of the Com-
missioner's discretion in rejecting the Association's accounting
system was not unsound, we need not anticipate what will be the
product of further 'study of this entire problem.' "48
In the dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Stewart correctly pointed
out that the enactment and repeal of sections 452 and 462 was
only intended to restore the status quo and not to rule out all defer-
ral not specifically permitted by Congress." In all probability,
the Court did not intend to outlaw all deferral methods not
specifically allowed by Congress."° This probability is supported
by the following facts: the Court in AAA specifically refrained
44. Id. at 692. See also Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979) for
a recent reaffirmation of this point.
45. The AAA Court noted that the pro-rata equal monthly deferral did not square closely
enough with the after-the-fact average monthly costs computed on a "group or pool" basis. 367
U.S. at 693. The AAA Court further stated in dicta that had an after-the-fact deferral system ac-
tually been used by the taxpayer, it would flunk tax accounting standards. 367 U.S. at 693. The
AAA Court did not discuss before-the-fact deferral systems.
46. See Automobile Club of New York v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 781 (2nd Cir. 1962),
which viewed Bressner Radio, as having survived AAA since the before-the-fact predictions closely
matched the actual expenses.
47. 367 U.S. at 697.
48. Id. at 697-98 (emphasis added). Note the restrictive wording here.
49. Id. at 703-11 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. See the excellent discussion of this question in Mooney Aircraft, inc. v. United States,
420 F.2d 400, 402-09 (5th Cir. 1969).
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from overruling Beacon Publishing;51 the fact of the restrictive
nature of the AAA holding;k and the fact that Congress had refused
to allow deferral for prepaid auto club dues by specific statute.
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Schlude v.
Commissioner,3 the third case in the Supreme Court trilogy deal-
ing with prepayment for future services. Schlude rejected a deferral
method which allocated prepayments for future services on the
basis of the actual services rendered under the contract as of the
end of each accounting period, a type of after-the-fact allocation
which the AAA Court had rejected in dicta.5" The taxpayer in
Schlude had entered into non-cancellable contracts allowing no
refunds, under which the taxpayer agreed to provide dance lessons
at unspecified future dates. At the close of each tax accounting
period, the taxpayer recognized income to that date on the basis
of the number of dance lessons given thus far. The Schlude Court
rejected the deferral method as being "artificial" since, as in
Automobile Club of Michigan and AAA, "the advance payments
related to services which were to be performed only upon
customers' demands without relation to fixed dates in the future."
5"
In a footnote,6 the Schlude Court attempted to illustrate the
reason why deferral methods based on experience each year were
fatally "artificial." The taxpayer in Schlude, by an arbitrary rule
of thumb, recognized "gains from cancellations" when the customer
actually happened to demand no services during the year.57 The
Schlude Court complained that: "The studio made no attempt to
report estimated cancellations in the year of receipt, choosing in-
stead to defer these gains to periods bearing no economic rela-
tionship to the income recognized."" It seems clear that reasonably
accurate statistical methods of estimating, before-the-fact, the ser-
vices that would actually be rendered in the future were sanctioned
by the Schlude Court as an acceptable substitute for the after-the-
fact deferral method used by the taxpayer."9 Only by such a before-
the-fact estimation of future services could there be a proper
51. 367 U.S. at 691 n.4.
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
54. See supra note 45.
55. 372 U.S. at 135.
56. Id. at 136 n.9.
57. Id. at 131-32.
58. Id. at 136 n.9 (emphasis added).
59. See Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. at 142-43.
Note here that Justice Stewart incorrectly failed to distinguish between a deferral system based
on before-the-fact statistical estimates suggested as a "cure" by the majority in Schlude, and the
after-the-fact statistical deferral system rejected in dicta by the majority in AAA. See supra note 45.
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matching of revenues and expenses in a situation where the tax-
payer was obligated to render future services, solely upon demand,
without relation to fixed future dates. An annual after-the-fact
deferral system in such a situation is flawed because of lack of
demonstrable certainty, at the end of each tax year which the con-
tract covers, as to whether more services would have to be
rendered in the future periods remaining until the contract
expired.6 The concern seems to have been that demonstrably
definite assurance be given that the deferred income is reported
as the related costs do in fact occur under the deferral system.
The Schlude Court also discussed as an additional ground for
its rejection of the deferral system involved, the policy express-
ed in AAA of viewing the enactment and repeal of Internal Revenue
Code §452 as indicative of Congressional intent of "reinstating
long-standing administrative and lower court rulings that accoun-
ting systems deferring prepaid income could be rejected by the
Commissioner."6' Even though this could be read as a carte blan-
che for the Commissioner to reject any deferral system not
specifically authorized by statute, it seems clear that the Court
only meant to give the Commissioner wide, but not absolute,
discretion to reject deferral systems not specificlly allowed by
statute.
62
Schlude, decided in 1963, was the last word the Supreme
Court has spoken on the prepaid service income issue, and it is
clear that any case which would allow deferral of prepaid service
income today must first hurdle the difficult, yet not insurmoun-
table, barriers set up by the Supreme Court in its Automobile Club
of Michigan, AAA, and Schlude "trilogy" of cases.6
FROM THE TRILOGY TO RCA Corp. v. United States IN i980
Soon after the last installment of the Supreme Court trilogy
in Schlude, the Tax Court, speaking through Judge Drennen in
Simplified Tax Records, Inc. v. Commissioner," had an oppor-
tunity to assess the impact of the trilogy on the prepaid income
area of the tax law. Although the case dealt with the accrual of
60. This failure is crucial since without an estimation as to the amount of service to be per-
formed in the following period, it is impossible to determine whether the right amount is being
deferred.
61. 372 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added).
62. See Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
63. The precise nature of these barriers to deferral after the trilogy will be discussed later
in this paper.
64. 41 T.C. 75 (1963).
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estimated future expenses, the "flip side" of deferral of prepaid
income, Judge Drennen spoke of the impact of the trilogy generally
on this problematic area of tax law.
Whether these more recent decisions of the Supreme Court will lay these
problems to rest is problematical because the Court speaks in broad terms
and it is not always clear just what the fundamental bases for the deci-
sions are-hence other cases may be distinguished. See Automobile Club
of New York v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 781 (1962), wherein the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while relying upon American
Automobile Assn. v. United States, supra, to hold against the taxpayer,
distinguished its own prior decision in favor of the taxpayer in Bressner
Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (1959) *65
In a footnote, the court continued,
We suspect, because of its repeated emphasis on the Commissioner's
discretion under sec. 41 of the 1930 Code and sec. 446 of the 1954 Code,
and the legislative history of secs. 452 and 462, that the majority of
the Supreme Court stand for the principle that, absent statutory sanc-
tions for it, unless the taxpayer can show that the Commissioner clearly
abused his discretion in disallowing deferral of prepaid income or ac-
crual of estimated expenses, this exercise of the Commissioner's discre-
tion will not be disturbed by the Court even though the taxpayer's method
of accounting is in accord with generally accepted principles of com-
mercial accounting. We also suspect that this principle, if such it be,
will be met with some resistance in the courts."
This assessment of the trilogy proved to be a prophetic hint as
to what the future would eventually hold for the prepaid income
area.
The bulk of the early post-trilogy decisions dealing with defer-
ral of prepaid income came out of the Tax Court. In 1963, the
Tax Court formulated its response to the Supreme Court trilogy.
In the case of Popular Library, Inc. v. Commissioner,67 the Tax
Court held that the trilogy had laid down a rule of law absolutely
and unequivocally disallowing any deferral of prepaid service in-
come absent a specific statute permitting deferral in a given
situation." This hardline "fundamentalist" view of the trilogy was
soon surprisingly extended by the Tax Court to cases involving
65. Id. at 81.
66. Id. n.6 (emphasis added).
67. 39 T.C. 1092 (1963).
68. Id. at 1099.
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customer advances for the sale of goods,"9 and for the next decade
the Tax Court clung rigidly to its absolutist no-deferral
philosophy.70
Outside the Tax Court, the earliest post-trilogy decisions were
split.7' In Parkchester Beach Club Corp. v. Commissioner, ' decid-
ed in 1964, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed defer-
ral of prepaid service income, citing the trilogy as authority. The
court was careful to distinguish its earlier decision in Automobile
Club of New York v. Commissioner which had in turn viewed
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner as surviving the Supreme
Couit's AAA decision." Apparently, the Second Circuit would have
allowed deferral on the basis of Bressner Radio had there been
a way to match revenues and expenses by estimating before-the-
fact "with reasonable accuracy" the costs of future services due
under the contract and deferring prepayments on that basis. 4
From a historical perspective, the most important post-trilogy
case dealing with the prepaid service income issue was Artnell
Company v. Commissioner" decided by the Seventh Cirduit in
1968. In Artnell, the taxpayer owned a professional baseball team
and received prepayments for services in the form of season
tickets. The Artnell court, in allowing deferral on the basis that
there was a "fixed" schedule of baseball games to be played, made
analogies to Beacon Publishing6 which the Supreme Court had
69. Chester Farrara v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 189 (1965); Hagen Advertising Displays v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 139 (1966); S. Garber, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 733 (1969). See
also Fifth and York Co. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Ky. 1964). This resulted
despite earlier contrary authority in Veenstra & De Haan Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.
964 (1948) and Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951), holding
the general no-deferral-of-prepaid-income rule inapplicable to sales of goods.
70. See Cox v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 448 (1965); William 0. McMahon, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C. 221 (1965); Decision, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 58 (1966); and Angelus
Funeral Home v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 391 (1967).
71. Compare James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964) with
Parkchester Beach Cljb Corp. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 478 (2nd Cir. 1964) and Franklin
Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 399 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1968).
72. 335 F.2d 478 (2nd Cir. 1964).
73. Id. at 480. On the issue of whether Bressner Radio was overruled by AAA, see also Smith
Motors v. United States, 61-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9627 (D.C. Vt. 1961) (Bressner alive), and Na-
tional Bank of Fort Benning v. United States, 44 A.F.T.R.2d para. 79-6061, 79-6070 (M.D.
Ga. 1979) (Bressner alive). Franklin Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 399 F.2d 757, 763
(7th Cir. 1968), cen. denied, 393 U.S. 1118 (Bressner dead). Compare also Bell Electric Co.
v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 158, 166 (1965) (Bressner must be consider "in the light of" the trilogy).
74. Parkchester Beach Club Corp., 335 F.2d at 480.
75. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968), remanded29 Tax Ct. Mem. (CCH) 403 (1970). See Franklin
Life Insurance Co., 339 F.2d at 763 in which the Seventh Circuit had forshadowed its result in
Artnell. See also Automated Marketing Systems, Inc. v. United States, 74-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9711
(D.C. Illinois 1974) affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in unpublished opinion January 9, 1975,
in which deferral was allowed on the basis of reliable estimates of cost arising under the service
contract.
76. Beacon Publishing, 218 F.2d 697.
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specifically refrained from overruling in the trilogy. The court
reasoned that:
It is best judgment that, although the policy of deferring where possi-
ble, to congressional procedures in the tax field will cause the Supreme
Court to accord the widest possible latitude to the Commissioner's discre-
tion, there must be situations where the deferral technique will so clearly
reflect income that the Court will find an abuse of discretion if the Com-
missioner rejects it. "
The "certainty" of the fixed schedule of baseball games have al-
lowed the court to allow a deferral technique based on the schedule
despite the Commissioner's objections. 8
As one authority puts it, "the Artnell case delivered a major
jolt to long-standing and generally accepted policy requiring tax-
payers, whether on the cash or accrual method, to include amounts
received for goods and services to be furnished in a later year
in income in the year of receipt.""9 As will be discussed, since
Artnell, a significant number of courts considering the problem
in light of the trilogy have adopted a somewhat relaxed rule con-
cerning deferral of prepaid income. Indeed, even the Service decid-
ed to recant partially as will be discussed.
The early judicial reaction to the Seventh Circuit's analysis
of the trilogy in Artnell was mixed. The First Circuit was not sure
what to think of Artnell,0 and the Sixth Circuit seemingly de-
clined to follow Artnell,"1 while the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
the correctness of Artnell though distinguishing it factually from
the case before it.8"
The building conflict between the circuit courts since Artnell
symbolized an inner conflict within the Internal Revenue Service
77. 400 F.2d at 984-85 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 985.
79. Freeland, Lind, and Stevens, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation, 577 (2nd ed.
1977).
80. New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d
1038 (1st Cir. 1969). Cf. Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v. Commisioner, 420 F.2d 352, 358 (1st Cir.
1970) dealing with a cash method taxpayer.
81. Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105, 1109 n.7 (6th Cir.
1969) (sale of goods). This case might be criticized because, in arriving at its "absolutely-no-
deferral" result, the court apparently missed the fact that in AAA the Supreme Court had specifically
distinguished Beacon and Schuessler, as it had done previously in Automobile Club of Michigan.
(Compare 407 F.2d 1105, 1109 n.5 with 367 U.S. 687, 691 n.4.) See also Grinder, Taber, &
Grinder, Inc. v. United States, 75-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9546 (D.C. Tenn. 1975).
82. Angelus Funeral Homes v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 824 (1969). A "trust fund" was not really involved here since the prepayments could
be used for the taxpayer's benefit subject to some limits.
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over the precise meaning of the Service's victory in the trilogy.
It is interesting to note that the government did not petition for
certiorari in Artnell,83 perhaps out of fear that the Supreme Court
would have limited the reach of the trilogy. In what one authori-
ty calls "a remarkable volte-face," ' the Internal Revenue Service
decided in two Revenue Procedures" issued in 1970 and 1971
and a regulation 6 amended in 1971 to allow limited deferral of
prepayments for future services and sales of goods in carefully
defined circumstances.
Revenue Procedure 70-21,"' as superseded by substantially
identical Revenue Procedure 71-21," was designed to reconcile
the tax and financial accounting treatment of prepayments for ser-
vices in a "large proportion" of the cases, by allowing a limited
one year89 deferral in carefully defined circumstances for accrual
method taxpayers."' The deferral treatment was allowed only
where the service contract covered periods lasting no longer than
the end of the next taxable year,9 and the limited deferral privilege
was stated not to include amounts received under guaranty or war-
ranty contracts or to prepaid rent or to prepaid interest.9
In a parallel development in 1971, Treas. Regs. Section
1.451-5 came out, allowing accural method taxpayers receiving
"substantial" advance payments for goods includible in inventory
to defer the prepayments up to two years following the year in
which the substantial advance payments are received. 3 Advance
payments for noninventoriable goods could be deferred until the
taxable year in which the goods are shipped.9
The Fifth Circuit got its chance to respond to Artnell in its
well written opinion in Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States95
decided in 1970. This case involved an attempt to accrue estimated
83. Freeland, Lind, and Stevens, supra note 79, at 579.
84. BoRmis BiT-rKER, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs 105-63 (1981).
85. Rev. Proc. 70-21, 1970-2 C.B. 501; Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549.
86. Treas. Regs. § 1.451-5 (1971).
87. 1970-2 C.B. 501.
88. Rev. Proc. 71-2 1, supra note 85. See also Rev. Rul. 71-299, supra note 37, relaxing
the Service's anti-Bressner Radio stance "to the extent" inconsistent with Rev. Proc. 71-21 (repealed
Pub. Law No. 84-74, 169 Stat. 134).
89. Contrast I.R.C. § 452 (1954) (repealed by Pub. L No. 84-74, 69 Stat. 134) which allowed
five year deferral. The Service can hardly be accused of being generous here.
90. Rev. Proc. 71-21, § 2, supra note 85.
91. Id. at §§ 3.02, 3.03.
92. Id. at § 3.08.
93. Treas. Regs. § 1.451-5(c).
94. Treas. Regs. § 1.451-5(b).
95. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970). See also National Bank of Fort Benning v. United States,
44 A.F.T.R. 2d para. 79-6061 (M.D. Ga. 1979).
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expenses rather than defer prepaid receipts. Since the principles
involved are generally similar, the opinion comprehensively
surveyed the history of the law on prepaid income. The court
viewed the trilogy as having taken a "middle ground" in the area,
the repeal of sections 452 and 462 having served to vest the Com-
missioner with very wide (yet not absolute) discretion to disallow
deferral or reserve systems pending Congressional reform and
clarification in this extremely confused area of law. The Fifth Cir-
cuit quoted dicta from the early post-trilogy Tax Court Simplified
Tax Records case as support for its "middle ground" view that
the trilogy created no absolute bar to deferral."6
The Tax Court, which prior to Artnell had rigidly held to a
view of the trilogy as setting up an absolute bar to deferral absent
specific statutory authorization," seemed to retreat a little in Stan-
dard Television Tube Corp. v. Commissioner98 decided in 1975.
There the court while seemingly recognizing Artnell as authori-
ty, distinguished it because of the lack of certainty of performance
or fixed future service dates. In Allied Fidelity Corp. v.
Commissioner" decided in 1976, the Tax Court again acknowl-
edged Artnell as authority yet distinguished it factually. However,
here the case was appealable to the Seventh Circuit."°
The Court of Claims got its chance to hop on the Artnell band-
wagon in 1976, when it decided Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States. ' The court allowed deferral of prepaid service income
where the engineering services to be performed related to the con-
struction of an electric power plant. Deferral was based on con-
tinually revised estimates of the service hours needed to complete
the contract. In following Artnell and Mooney Aircraft, the court
found sufficient "certainty" of dates of performance to justify
deferral." 2
The Court of Claims quickly extended the deferral rationale
of Boise Cascade to prepaid interest in Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York v. United States"0 ' decided in 1978. The opinion
96. 420 F.2d at 408, 409. Note that from 1963 to 1967 the Tax Court had consistently
ignored its own Simplified Tax Records dicta, instead viewing the trilogy as an absolute bar. See
cases cited supra note 70.
97. Supra note 70.
98. 64 T.C. 238 (1975).
99. 66 T.C. 1068 (1976), affd, 572 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978).
100. The rule of Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), would thus apply requiring the Tax
Court to recognize as controlling a rule set out by a Court of Appeal in the circuit to which a
case at bar was appealable.
101. 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cf. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
102. Id. at 1377-78, 1378 n.8.
103. 585 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
19821
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
remarked that "where there is no distortion of income or poten-
tial for distortion under a method of tax accounting because the
date income is earned is easily ascertainable, it is an abuse of the
Commissioner's discretion to switch a taxpayer's method of tax
accounting to a different method."'0 " Nonetheless, the court noted
that the de minimis amount of prepaid interest income, compared
with total interest income raised a serious question as to the ex-
istence of even the potential for a "material income distortion."
In addition, the daily nature of interest earnings and the fact that
the interest prepayment was not a condition for the loan decided
the court in favor of allowing deferral."5
The Tax Court toyed around with Artnell again in 1978, when
it decided Collegiate Cap & Gown Co. v. Commissioner, " a case
appealable to the Seventh Circuit. Here the Tax Court allowed
deferral where there was certainty of future performance dates,
citing Artnell as controlling although quipping that this did not
"necessarily impl[y] that we accept the Seventh Circuit's approach
in comparable cases not appealable to that circuit. ""° In T.F.H.
Publications, Inc. v. Commissioner " decided in 1979, in a case
affirmed by the Third Circuit, the Tax Court speaking through
Judge Drennen (author of the Simplified Tax Records dicta)"° ex-
plicity recanted from its earlier absolute rule of nondeferral, and
instead said that nondeferral is not a rule of law but only a "general
rule of thumb."' While accepting the Artnell rationale of allow-
ing deferral where there is a certainty of performance or fixed
dates, the court disallowed deferral in the case at bar because of
just such a lack of certainty or fixed dates.1"
It would seem that as of 1980 the trend of judicial authority
supported the Artnell analysis of the trilogy. Although the repeal
of sections 452 and 462 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code re-
quires the courts to give the "widest possible latitude" to the Com-
missioner's discretion under Code section 446(b) to reject account-
ing systems not clearly reflective of income, where the facts show
104. Id. at 997.
105. Id. But see Bjomsen Investment Corp. v. United States, 81-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9258 (D.C.
Iowa 1981), which refused to allow deferral of prepaid interest since, although it acknowledged
Morgan Guaranty, the "de minimis amount" and "regulatory requirement" factors were not present.
106. 37 T.C.M. 960 (1978).
107. Id. at 965.
108. 72 T.C. 623 (1979), affd by the Third Circuit in unpublished opinion May 27, 1980,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
109. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
110. T.H.F. Publications, 72 T.C. at 641.
Il1. Id. at 6AA.
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a certainty of performance on fixed dates in the future, deferral
of prepayments on the basis of the schedule of performance is
allowable.
RCA v. United States: THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION
On August 14, 1980, RCA Corp. v. United States... was decid-
ed by Judge Lasker for the Southern District of New York, allow-
ing deferral of prepaid income. A flurry of optimistic articles
greeted this bold case as infusing new life into the deferral
doctrine. "1
In RCA, the taxpayer received prepayments for service con-
tracts of periods varying from three to twenty-four months where-
by, upon the customer's demand, it would render television repair
service on television sets it had just sold to the customer. The
taxpayer was on the accrual basis for both tax and book purposes.
The prepayments were allocated between "revenue immediately
recognized" to cover the costs of processing and selling the con-
tract plus a profit, and "unearned revenue" treated as a liability.
Each month throughout the life of the service contracts, the un-
earned revenue account was credited to earned revenue, based
on statistically derived schedules designed to take into account
as revenue each month that portion of the prepayments attributable
to the services performed that month under such contracts. A graph
was stipulated into evidence showing that for the tax years in ques-
tion the unearned revenue credited to earned revenue monthly on
the basis of the schedules achieved a remarkably close correla-
tion with the related direct service expenses actually incurred dur-
ing each month of the tax years in question."'
The district court began its legal analysis by quoting United
States v. Anderson"5 wherein the Supreme Court in 1926 had ex-
plained that the purpose of the provision of the Revenue Act of
1916 which first permitted the accrual method for tax accounting
purposes was "to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make
their returns according to scientific principles, by charging against
112. 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1981).
113. Raabe, New Case Permits Use of Statistical Evidence to Justify Deferral of Tax on Prepaid
Income, TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS 280 (November 1980); Seago, What Chance for Prepaid
Income Deferrals Based on Statistical Estimates After RCA?, 54 J. TAX'N 16 (January 1981);
Thieves, Revenue Recognition Help in RCA v. United States, 33 TAX EXECUTIVE 216 (April 1981);
Ehrlick, Deferring Prepaid Income, 12 TAX ADVISER 294 (May 1981); and Stewart and Woods,
Analysis of the Trend Toward Deferring Recognition of Prepaid Income, 59 TAXES 400 (June 1981).
114. 499 F. Supp. at 519-21.
115. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
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income earned during the taxable period, to expenses incurred
in and properly attributable to the process of earning income during
that period." '116 Then the district court went into the section 446(b)
clear-reflection-of-income issue, by taking a close look at the
trilogy. The district court viewed the trilogy in a new light:
In our view, the teachings of the trilogy can be briefly summarized as
follows: Michigan and AAA establish that a taxpayer may not simply
prorate recognition of receipts as revenue over the period in which the
service covered by those receipts is to be rendered, because there is
no assurance that those services will be rendered ratably over that period.
Schlude, on the other hand, establishes that a taxpayer may not,
automatically each year, recognize revenue to the extent of actual ex-
penses incurred that year, because there is no assurance that this amount
will accurately reflect the portion of the total expenses to be incurred
under the contract attributable to that year. In each of these cases the
Court found the taxpayers' method of accounting for prepaid receipts
"artificial" not, as the Government contends here, because those receipts
related to services to be performed at unspecified times in tax years subse-
quent to that of their receipt, but rather, as RCA argues, because in each
case the taxpayers' accounting method failed to account properly for that
fact through the use of adequately supported statistical projections.""
The district court found a justification for its views by noting
that the Supreme Court in Schlude had rejected after-the-fact defer-
ral systems but had suggested that before-the-fact statistical pro-
jections of anticipated expenses would have been satisfactory." 8
The court disposed of arguments based on Thor Power Tool Co.
v. Commissioner,"9 where the Supreme Court in 1979 had em-
phasized the fundamentally different objectives of financial and
tax accounting, by noting that Thor Power Tool itself had sug-
gested the use of hard statistical evidence to write down inven-
tories, rather than "reasonable" assumptions based on general
business experience or well-educated guesses."'2 Then the court
expressed its holding as follows: "In our view, a taxpayer is en-
titled to rely on reliable statistical projections of anticipated ex-
penses in determining the extent to which prepaid amounts should
be included in gross income in tax years other than that of their
receipt, in accordance with the principles of accrual accounting."12
116. Id. at 440.
117. 499 F. Supp. at 515-16.
118. Id. at 516.
119. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
120. 499 F. Supp. at 516.
121. Id.
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The district court rejected the argument that the trilogy viewed
the legislative history of section 452 as setting up an absolute
nondeferral rule absent specific statute allowing deferral. The court
in dicta noted that the government's case was "undercut" to some
extent here due to the Commissioner's partial recantation in Rev.
Proc. 71-21.122
Finally, the district court found that taxpayer here had car-
ried its burden of proving that its deferral technique "operated
with reasonable precision" and concluded that the Commissioner
had abused his discretion under section 446(b).12
RCA v. United States: THE SECOND CIRCUIT OPINION
When the RCA case was appealed to the Second Circuit ear-
ly in 1981, it appeared probable that the court would affirm the
lower court holding in favor of the taxpayer, because of the Se-
cond Circuit cases of Bressner Radio, Automobile Club of New
York and Parkchester Beach Club allowing deferral on the basis
of accurate statistical predictions. 24 Also, the Tax Court in
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Commissioner,"'s decid-
ed in 1980, approvingly cited RCA in a "cf. "footnote dealing with
the validity of statistical studies for tax purposes " 6
On November 13, 1981, the Second Circuit surprisingly
reversed the district court's holding in RCA v. United States.27
After briefly reviewing the district court's opinion, the Second
Circuit concluded that the lower court gave too little weight to
the goals of tax accounting and to the Commissioner's wide discre-
tion in implementing those objectives.
First, the court thought that the lower court used the wrong
standard in reviewing the Commissioner's exercise of discretion,
i. e., the question is not whether the taxpayer's method of account-
ing "clearly reflected income" but whether there is an adequate
122. Id. at 519. The court apparently felt that it was hypocritical for the I.R.S. to in one
breath sanction to the limited use of statistical deferral methods in Rev. Proc. 71-21, supra note
88, at § 3.06, while in the next breath attacking RCA's statistical deferral method in the case
at bar as not "clearly reflecting income."
123. 499 F. Supp. at 522-23.
124. See supra note 35 and 75 and accompanying text. See also Bayshore Gardens, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 55 (2nd Cir. 1959).
125. 75 T.C. 497 (1980). Judge Drennen, author of the decision in T.F.H. Publications,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 623 (1979) wrote the voluminous opinion touching tangentially
on the RCA opinion.
126. Id. at 792 n.349.
127. 664 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1981), rev'g 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
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basis in law for the Commissioner's conclusion that it did not. 128
Next, the court reviewed the Supreme Court prepaid income
trilogy to extract the underlying policy considerations. The Sec-
ond Circuit thought these policy considerations to be "quite clear":
When a taxpayer receives income in the form of prepayments in respect
of services to be performed in the future upon demand, it is impossible
for the taxpayer to know, at the outset of the contract term, the amount
of service that his customer will ultimately require, and, consequently,
it is impossible for the taxpayer to predict with certainty the amount
of net income, i. e., the amount of the excess of revenues over expenses
of performance, that he will ultimately earn from the contract. For pur-
poses of financial accounting, this uncertainty is tolerable; the financial
accountant merely estimates future demands for performance and defers
recognition of income accordingly. Tax accounting, however, "can give
no quarter to uncertainty." Thor Power Tool, supra 439 U.S. at 543,
99 S. Ct. at 786. The entire process of government depends on the ex-
peditious collection of tax revenues. Tax accounting therefore tends to
compute taxable income on the basis of the taxpayer's present ability
to pay the tax, as manifested by his current cash flow, without regard
to deductions that may later accrue.129
The court then went on to reason that since the RCA con-
tracts created obligations dependent only upon the customer's de-
mand for services, which were impossible to predict with com-
plete certainty, the Commissioner acted within his discretion in
requiring RCA to report its prepaid service contract income upon
receipt.
After brushing aside its own Bressner Radio decision (which
allowed deferral based on reasonably accurate predictions of future
services) as having been expressly and impliedly overruled by
AAA and Schlude,"' the Second Circuit went on to stress its view
that no "prediction," no matter how accurate, could serve as a
permissible basis for deferral without the Commissioner's
approval.'
The Second Circuit's opinion that AAA, Schlude, and Thor
Power effectively negate the use of any statistical predictions,
regardless of how accurate they may be, is doubtful on at least
128. 664 F.2d at 886. This criticism seems to focus on the semantics rather than the substance
of the district court's opinion which acknowledged the Commissioner's extremely wide discretion
in the prepaid income area, yet viewed that discretion as exceeding permissible limits on the basis
of the facts before it.
129. Id. at 887-88.
130. Id. at 888. This is a disputed issue. See the conflicting views concerning the current
viability of Bressner Radio, note 73 supra.
131. 664 F.2d at 8-09.
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two grounds. First, the Supreme Court in AAA and Schlude dealt
only with the after-the-fact use of descriptive statistics as op-
posed to before-the-fact use of statistical inference.132 This is under-
lined by the Supreme Court's apparent suggestion in footnote nine
of Schlude that the use of before-the-fact statistical estimates would
have cured the defect in the taxpayer's deferral method.13
Second, a close analysis of the Supreme Court's recent tax
accounting decision in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner"'
sharpens the principle expressed in footnote nine of Schlude con-
cerning the use of estimates for tax accounting purposes. In Thor
Power Tool, as in footnote nine of Schlude, the Supreme Court
criticized the taxpayer for failing to present statistically evidenc-
ed estimates.3 ' What the Supreme Court did reject expressly in
Thor Power Tool and by implication in Schlude was the use of
accounting methods based on relatively artificial assumptions such
as general business experience or well-educated guesses, methods
which are reasonable enough for financial accounting purposes
yet too imprecise for tax accounting purposes.3 '
RESTATEMENT OF PREPAID SERVICE
INCOME TAX LAW
Having completed the task of tracing the evolution of the tax
law concerning accrual basis taxpayers who receive prepayments
for future services, it is now possible to come to some conclu-
sions as to what the tax law requires for one to properly defer
the prepayments. The remaining discussion attempts to arrive at
a restatement of the prepaid service income tax law in the area
outside the safe harbor of Revenue Procedure 71-21, which covers
probably the majority of cases in the area.
The starting point today is I.R.C. § 446(a) which provides
that: "Taxable income shall be computed under the method of ac-
counting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes
his income in keeping his books.""3 7 This section has its origins
in sections 8(g) and 13(d) of the Revenue Act of 1916,138 the pur-
132. See supra note 45 and supra note 54 and accompanying text. Only before-the-fact use
of statistical inference concerning the extent of future services to be rendered under the contract
can adequately "match" expenses against prepayments where services are to be rendered only upon
the customer's demand without relation to fixed future dates.
133. The Second Circuit did not mention footnote 9 of Schlude in its opinion.
134. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
135. Thor Power Tool, 439 U.S. at 528-29 and Schlude, 372 U.S. at 136 n.9.
136. Id.
137. I.R.C. § 446(a) (1976).
138. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8(g), 13(d), 39 Stat. 763, 771.
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pose of which was to relieve the distortions caused by the strict
application of the cash receipts and disbursements method, by
enabling "taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns
according to scientific accounting principles, by charging against
income earned during the taxable period, the expenses incurred
in and properly attributable to the process of earning income during
that period.""3 9 Note two key principles. First, income must be
"earned" during the taxable period in which it is to be recognized
and second, expenses related to earning the income must be off-
set against the income in the same period.1"'
Internal Revenue Code § 451(a) currently states that "[tjhe
amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the gross
income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer
unless under the method of accounting used in computing tax-
able income such amount is to be properly accounted for in A dif-
ferent period."
Treas. Regs. Section 1.451-1(a) helps out here by stating that:
"Under an accrual method of accounting, income is includible in
gross income when all the events have occurred which fix the right
to receive such income and the amount thereof can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy."1 This of course is the "all events
test" originating in United States v. Anderson," which, as
previously discussed, also dealt with the original statute allow-
ing accrual method for tax accounting purposes.
The "all events test" is a key to determining when an accrual
method taxpayer should include prepayments for future services
in gross income. Under the "all events test," it is not the actual
receipt of a payment but the right to receive payment that deter-
mines the taxable year of inclusion.' Furthermore, substantial-
ly all events must occur which fix the right to receive payment.
It seems clear that there is no legal "right" to receive payment
until the payments have been earned by discharging "the liability
to perform services under the contract." "
Up to this point in the concluding analysis, it would appear
that the tax accounting principles on prepaid service income re-
139. Anderson, 269 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
140. These are the "revenue realization" and "matching" principles of financial accounting.
See KIESO & WYEGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 32-36 (3rd ed. 1980).
141. Treas. Regs. § 1.451-1(a) (emphasis added).
142. 269 U.S. at 440.
143. See Spring City Co. v. Commisioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1933) and Commissioner
v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 449 (1958), cited in Schlude, 372 U.S. at 137. See also Mooney Air-
craft, 420 F.2d at 403.
144. See Bressner Radio, Inc., 267 F.2d at 523.
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ceived by accrual method taxpayers are identical to the financial
accounting principles of "revenue recognition" and "matching. " ""
That is precisely the result mandated by the Supreme Court in
Anderson, except for the fact that Code section 446(b) contains
the following language also originating in the Revenue Act of
1916: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used by
the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect in-
come, the computation of taxable income shall be made under
such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary does clearly reflect
income. " 1,6 This clearly-reflect-income exception to tax account-
ing principles othewise applicable is a "safety valve""7 for the Com-
missioner, astatutory overlay on otherwise valid tax accounting
rules.
In Anderson the Supreme Court in 1926 seemed to view the
clear-reflection-of-income exception as conditioning accrual ac-
counting for tax purposes on the tax return reflecting "true net
income."" 8 The Supreme Court trilogy of cases on prepaid ser-
vice income, Automobile Club of Michigan, AAA, and Schlude,
allowed the Commissioner to use the clear-reflection-of-income
safety valve to reject accounting systems deferring prepayments
for future services which were "artificial" for tax purposes even
though based on generally accepted accounting principles." The
artificiality arose from the fact that in all three trilogy cases the
nonrefundable prepayments for future services were to be per-
formed "only upon customers' demand without relation to fixed
dates in the future."1" The concern was that as each tax year closed,
there was a real possibility that a good portion of the nonre-
fundable prepayments received that year would never be "earn-
ed" in later tax years because the customer might fail to demand
services and hence would have been really "earned by default"
in the year of receipt yet not reported in the year of receipt. This
significant potential for distortion of "true net income" justified
the Commissioner's use of Code section 446(b) to reject the defer-
ral system in the trilogy of cases.
145. Supra note 140.
146. I.R.C. § 446(b)(1976).
147. Austin, Surrey, Warren, and Winkour, supra note 20, at 260.
148. 269 U.S. at 439.
149. Note here that although generally accepted accounting principles are "ordinarily" suffi-
cient, United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926), and Treas. Regs. § 1.446-1(a)(2), they
are not conclusively clearly reflective of true net income for tax accounting purposes. Thor Power
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
150. Schlude, 367 U.S. at 136.
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Where there is no significant potential for distortion of true
net income in a deferral system, it would seem that Code section
446(b) is no barrier to deferral. If the accrual basis taxpayer can
demonstrate that there is a substantially certain basis upon which
he can predict the timing of the actual rendition of services he
must render under the service contracts, there is no significant
distortion potential, and deferral of the prepayments is permissi-
ble. Either a fixed performance schedule for future services"' or
a statistically reliable projection of future services5 "' will provide
such a "substantially certain basis." Anything less than a substan-
tially certain basis will cause the deferral system to be exposed
to the Commissioner's ability to use the clear-reflection-of-income
safety valve to strike the system down.
The Code section 446(b) clear-reflection-of-income safety
valve, has obtained added significance since AAA and Schlude were
decided. These two decisions were not only based on the "ar-
tificiality" ground, but also upon the effect of the Congressional
enactment and repeal of Code section 452, the only statute "in-
contestably permitting"" deferral generally. It seems clear that
AAA and Schlude viewed this as being intended to give the Com-
missioner added room to exercise his already wide discretion in
using the Code section 446(b) safety valve, pending Congressional
study of the entire prepaid income problem.1 4 Since the promis-
ed reform of the prepaid income area"' -perhaps reenactment of
Code sections 452 and 462 with appropriate transitional rules to
slowly phase in the reform-has not been forthcoming, it is clear
that this element of AAA and Schlude is still in effect giving an
extra measure of discretion to the Commissioner in using section
446(b) to reject deferral systems not clearly reflecting true net
income.
As a result, it appears that accrual basis taxpayers desiring
to defer prepayments for future services must be prepared to
demonstrate convincingly that there is in fact a "substantially cer-
tain basis" upon which they can predict the timing of the actual
rendition of services under the contract. Absent a clear showing
of a fixed performance schedule or statistically reliable projec-
151. See Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955), and Art-
nell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
152. See Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1959), and RCA
Corp. v. United States, 499 F.Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y 1980)
153. American Automobile Ass'n., 367 U.S. at 694.
154. See RCA Corp., 499 F. Supp. 507, T.F.H. Publications, Inc., 72 T.C. 623; Boise Cascade
Corp., 530 F.2d 1367; Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 420 F.2d 400; and Artnell Co., 400 F.2d 981.
155. S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
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tion of future services, the exercise of the Commissioner's wide
discretion in using the Code section 446(b) safety valve will be
viewed as being within permissible limits.
Although the majority of taxpayers will probably not be able
to make such a clear showing," there are perhaps many taxpayers
in a position to do so. In the prepaid rent ' and prepaid interest.5 8
areas, it seems that taxpayers could qualify for deferral since the
reasonably certain basis would be supplied by the "fixed perfor-
mance schedule" nature of rent and interest. In the guaranty and
warranty areas, it likewise seems that many taxpayers could qualify
for deferral since the reasonably certain basis could be
demonstrated in many cases by "statistically reliable projections"
based on past experience.
CONCLUSION
A close reading of the Supreme Court trilogy on prepaid in-
come reveals that there are probably cracks in the dike, allowing
taxpayers deferral privileges where it is clearly shown that there
is no significant potential for distortion of true net income.
However, it is by no means a settled question, as the Second Cir-
cuit's recent opinion in RCA demonstrates.
The taxpayer has applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court
in RCA. The conflict between those courts seeing cracks in the
Supreme Court trilogy"5 and those seeing virtually none' could
156. Outside, of course, the safe harbor of Rev. Proc. 71-21, supra note 85.
157. Note that Rev. Proc. 71-21, supra note 85, specifically excepts rent from its protec-
tion. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-8(a), (b). For traditional result, see generally South Dade Farms,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); New Capital Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner,
261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958), affg 28 T.C. 706 (1957); Kohler-Campbell Corp. v. United States,
298 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1962). See also New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d 1038, (1st Cir. 1969) for prepaid rent case flirting with Artnell and
then disallowing deferral on the basis of Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-8 (a), (b).
158. Note that Rev. Proc. 71-21, supra note 85, specifically excepts interest from its pro-
tection. But see Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 585 F.2d 988 (allowing deferral of prepaid interest.)
See also Bjornsen Investment Corp., 81-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9258, (disallowing deferral of prepaid
interest on different facts).
159. Fifth Circuit:
Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 420 F.2d 400.
Seventh Circuit:
Artnell Co., 400 F.2d 981; Automated Marketing Systems, Inc., 74 U.S.T.C. para. 9711.
Court of Claims:
Bosie Cascade Corp., 530 F.2d 1367; Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 585
F.2d 988.
Tax Court:
TF.H. Publications, Inc., 72 T.C. 623; Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 75 T.C.
792 n.349.
160. Second Circuit:
RCA Corp., 664 F.2d 881.
Sixth Circuit:
Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc., 407 F.2d 1105.
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be resolved if the Supreme Court decides to take the RCA case
on appeal. The fact that the Supreme Court trilogy was each time
closely decided, the change in the composition of judges on the
Supreme Court since then, and the trend in favor of the narrow
view of the trilogy in Artnell all point to the probability that, were
the Supreme Court to take -on. RCA, the taxpayer would prevail.
